In a moneyless market, a non storable, non transferable homogeneous commodity is reallocated between agents with single-peaked preferences. Agents are either suppliers or demanders. Transfers between a supplier and a demander are feasible only if they are linked, and the links form an arbitrary bipartite graph. Typically, supply is short in one segment of the market, while demand is short in another.
and several other markets which can be modeled as matching problems (Gale and Shapley 1962, Roth and Sotomayor 1990). In the absence of a price signal, direct decentralized agreements between participants may be impractical 1 , or fail to achieve an e cient allocation of resources 2 . If a centralized mechanism is able to collect unbiased information about private characteristics of the concerned agents and to implement an e cient outcome, it stands as a convincing alternative to market clearing driven by bilateral agreements.
We study a simple moneyless market balancing the supply and demand for a non-storable, not freely-disposable, and non transferable commodity. Think of a group of service providers with limited control over their load of customers on a given day, so that some providers will receive more customer requests than they care to handle, while the load of other providers falls short of their ideal level. Emergency departments (ED) of hospitals routinely divert incoming patients away when they reach their capacity (NJHA 2009 ). The premature babies are transferred to other neonatal intensive care facilities when there are no vacant incubators in the hospital where the baby was born (BBC 2007 , Priest 2008 . Airlines transfer travelers around when they cannot honor their bookings. Similar opportunities for mutually advantageous spreading of the total work load arise routinely between hotels of comparable quality, or taxi companies in a given city, salesmen sharing customers, teachers sharing students, etc.. In such situations cash transfers are typically ruled out because they are not part of the organization's culture (as between co-workers), or because they would generate high transaction costs (hotel managers or taxi operators). In other situations there are ethical or legal reasons for ruling them out: public hospitals cannot entertain a kickback for referring a patient away.
Despite the absence of money, the process of clearing supply against demand retains the intrinsic characteristic of markets: individual preferences is the private information of each participant, and a centralized mechanism should elicit this information correctly. Hospitals declaring they have reached "red status" signal they cannot provide adequate service to an incremental patient, a largely subjective statement unveri able by an outsider 3 ; the ideal number of students in a class is not the same for all instructors, and the same applies to all manners of workload.
In our model the commodity (customers, patients) is homogenous and comes in divisible amounts. The former assumption is a realistic simpli cation in the taxi, hotel or student examples; ditto in the hospital example if we restrict attention to a given type of emergency patients (say, obstetrics, or post-natal care). The latter assumption is mostly technical (see concluding comments). Preferences of each agent are single-peaked around his ideal/target level (in particular, preferences are convex), and the market participants are either suppliers (agents whose initial endowment exceeds their ideal consumption of the commodity) or demanders (whose endowment is below their target consumption).
The richness of our model is to allow for arbitrary feasibility constraints on transfers between suppliers and demanders, and to view these constraints as private information as well. A centralized mechanism must elicit from the participants the set of feasible links (pairs of one supplier and one demander between which transfers are feasible); agents cannot report an unfeasible link, but are free to \close" unilaterally a feasible link. Such constraints are pervasive in our motivating examples: a given hospital can only divert patients to \nearby" hospitals with adequate facilities; transfers between salespersons are constrained by their pro ciency in various languages, and so on. In our model the bipartite graph of links is endogenous, because agents will close some links if it is in their interest to do so 4 .
We show that a centralized organization of the market is compatible with truthful revelation of both individual preferences and feasible links (in the strong sense of dominant strategy). This is relevant to some debates in the patients allocation example, where there is evidence that decentralized diversion is wasteful, and some attempts at centralization are being developed 5 .
Our egalitarian transfer mechanism is simple and well known in the 3 NJHA 2009 notes that "Diversions may be overridden by the emergency physician in charge when medical judgement indicates that the diverting hospital can handle a certain patient better than the alternative hospital."
4 In recent literature on buyer-seller networks (e.g., Kranton and Minehart 2000, Corominas-Bosch 2004), agents can similarly pay to establish a link with one another. Our model is however very di erent in that monetary transfers are ruled out.
5 REDDINET (http://www.reddinet.com) is a medical communications network linking hospitals in several California counties, for the purpose of improving the e ciency of patients' allocation. Then the short side of the market gets the ideal transfer, and the long side is uniformly rationed (Barbera and Jackson 1995; Klaus et al. 1998) 6 . Under bilateral constraints two complications arise. First, short supply and short demand typically coexist in the same problem, but in two segments of the market that do not interact in any e cient outcome. This feature is illustrated in Figure 1 .
There, clearly S 1 is a captive market for D 1 , a short demand against S 1 's long supply. Similarly fD 2 ; D 3 g is captive of fS 2 ; S 3 ; S 4 g, who are the short supply against fD 2 ; D 3 g's long demand. Note that D 1 and S 2 achieve their ideal consumption by a transfer of 6 units. However this transfer would shut out S 1 who can only send her surplus to D 1 . It is more e cient to transfer 6 units from S 1 to D 1 , then let S 2 ; S 3 ; S 4 give their 18 units to demanders 2 and 3.
A familiar graph-theoretical result, the Gallai-Edmonds decomposition (Ore 1962) , determines the partition of the market in up to three segments, and the corresponding structure of Pareto optimal allocations: in one seg-6 If the sum of demanders' peaks is larger than the sum of suppliers' peaks, we speak of short supply. Each supplier unloads an amount of commodity equal to her peak, and the total supply is rationed among demanders according to the uniform rationing method. Symmetrically, if the demand is short, each demander gets her ideal amount of commodity and the suppliers are uniformly rationed. 
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Figure 2: Agents on the short side are not treated identically ment supply is overdemanded, and the corresponding receivers are rationed; in the second segment supply is underdemanded, and the corresponding receivers eat more than their ideal share; and in the third segment (not present in the example above), supply exactly balances demand. The second complication is that agents in the long side do not simply get either their ideal transfer or a common transfer, as in Sprumont (1991). This feature is illustrated in Figure 2 .
There the entire supply is short against a long demand. Absent the bilateral constraints, each demander would receive 7 units. Under the above constraints, the most egalitarian distribution is 10 units for D 1 , 8 units for D 2 , and 5 units for each of D 3 and D 4 .
In a segment of the market with short supply (or short demand), the feasibility constraints take the form of core stability in a certain cooperative game, and the egalitarian transfers are the egalitarian solution (Dutta and Ray 1989) of this game. The compact de nition of our solution is as the Lorenz dominant pro le of transfers within the Pareto set (Proposition 2) 7 .
Thus our solution is much more di cult to compute than in the absence of bilateral constraints (Klaus et al. 1998 ). First we must nd the Gallai Edmonds decomposition, next we must solve a nite number of submodular linear systems (see section 4). Remarkably, the essential features of unconstrained uniform rationing are preserved, namely E ciency (Pareto optimality), and Strategyproofness (truthful revelation of one's preferences is a dominant strategy). The fairness properties of equal treatment of equals and no envy are also satis ed, provided we adapt their de nition to take the constraints into account (see section 5). Last but not least, in our mechanism every participant has no incentive to close a feasible link, as expressed by the link monotonicity property: whenever a link ij becomes feasible, ceteris paribus, neither supplier i nor demander j can be worse o .
Our main result (theorem 2, section 6), characterizes the egalitarian transfer mechanism by the combination of e ciency, strategyproofness, voluntary trade (no one prefers to walk out of the market, a consequence of link monotonicity), and (constrained) equal treatment of equals.
In the absence of bilateral constraints, and with agents' endowments known, a parallel result, with a stronger version of the standard equal treatment of equals, was established in Klaus et al. (1998) .
In the companion paper Bochet et al.
(2009), we analyze with the same techniques a one-sided version of the present model, that is a constrained generalization of Sprumont's fair division model (Sprumont 1991). The suppliers are now passive, they must unload a given amount of the commodity among the set of receivers, who each have a private ideal consumption level. See the concluding comments in section 6.
The random matching model of Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2004) can be viewed as another special case of the one developed here. There a man (resp. a woman) is compatible with an arbitrary subset of women (resp. men), and seeks to maximize the probability of a compatible match. We can interpret men as suppliers each with a target level of 1, women as demanders, also with a target level of 1, and the probability of the match (m; w) as the transfer from m to w. The segment of the market with short supply (resp. short demand) corresponds to the overdemanded men (resp. women) in Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2004) . They de ne the same egalitarian solution as we do here, and show that truthful revelation of one's compatible mates is a dominant strategy for every agent (even for any group of agents on the same side of the market); here this is the link monotonicity property.
Preferences and feasible allocations
We have a set S of suppliers with generic element i, and a set D of demanders with generic element j. A set of transfers of the single commodity from suppliers to demanders results in a vector (x; y) 2 R S + R D + where x i (resp. y j ) is supplier i's (resp. demander j's) net transfer, with
Supplier i (demander j) has single-peaked preferences over her net transfer x i with peak s i (respectively over her net transfer y j with peak d j ) 8 . We write R i ; R j for such preferences 9 , R for the set of single peaked preferences over R + , and R S[D for the set of preference pro les.
The commodity can only be transferred between certain pairs of supplier i, demander j. The bipartite graph G, a subset of S D, represents these constraints: ij 2 G means that a transfer is possible between i 2 S and j 2 D. We assume throughout that the graph G is connected, else we can treat each connected component of G as a separate problem.
We use the following notation. For any subsets T S, C D the restriction of G is G(T; C) = G \ fT Cg (not necessarily connected). The set of demanders compatible with the suppliers in T is f (T ) = fj 2 DjG(T; fjg) 6 = ?g. The set of suppliers compatible with the demanders in
A transfer of goods from S to D is realized by a G-ow ', i.e., a vector ' 2 R G + such that ' ij > 0 ) ij 2 G. We write (x('); y(')) for the transfers implemented by ', namely:
We say that the net transfers (x; y) are feasible if they are implemented by some G-ow. We write A(G) for the set of feasible net transfers, and de ne similarly A(G(T; C)) for any T S, C D. These sets are described in our rst result.
Lemma 1: For any S 0 S, D 0 D the three following statements are equivalent:
and y D 0 = x S 0 Proof: This is a standard application of the Marriage Lemma 10 .
For a given pro le of preferences R 2 R S[D , we speak of the economy (S; D; G; R) or simply (G; R) when this causes no confusion. All our results in the next two sections, as well as the de nition of our solution, only depend 9 Note that because a supplier is normally endowed with a nite amount of the commodity, her net trade cannot be arbitrarily large, and similarly the net trade of a demander should be capped. This however will not matter since all relevant net trades will take place in the intervals [0; si] and [0; dj].
10 See Ahuja et al. (1993) upon the pro le of peaks s; d, and not upon the full preference pro le R.
To signal such simpli cation, we will speak of a problem (S; D; G; s; d) or simply (G; s; d).
Pareto optimality
We write PO(G; R) for the set of Pareto optimal net transfers: it contains the feasible net transfer (x; y) if and only if for any other (x 0 ; y 0 ) 2 A(G) we have
To describe Pareto optimal allocations, we use a variant of the GallaiEdmonds decomposition for bipartite graphs (Ore, 1962 ). This result depends upon the problem (G; s; d) and not on the aspects of preferences other than peaks.
When we speak of the (sub)problem (G(S 0 ; D 0 ); s; d), we mean that the suppliers in S 0 will be transferring goods to the agents in D 0 along G(S 0 ; D 0 ), so that only the S 0 and the D 0 coordinates of s; d matter.
De nition We say that the problem (G(S
In a balanced problem the net transfer (s; d) is feasible; in a problem with short-demand some net transfers (d; y) with y s, are feasible (Lemma 1); in a problem with short-supply some net transfers (x; s) with x d are feasible (Lemma 1).
The next result says that any allocation problem (G; s; d) can be decomposed in three subproblems, one of each type.
Lemma 2: For any problem (G; s; d) where G is connected, and s; d 0, there exists unique partitions S + ; S 0 ; S of S, and
There are algorithms polynomial in the number of nodes jSj + jDj to compute the GE decomposition (see Ore, 1962) . Note that up to two of the pairs (S 0 ; D 0 ); (S + ; D ); or (S ; D + ) may be empty. One example is given in Figure 2 Section 1. Another one is when there are no feasibility constraints: G = S D. As in footnote 7 Section 1, we have: if
Proof: The Gallai-Edmonds decomposition of a bipartite graph (Ore 1962 ), gives precisely the statements when for all i 2 S, s i = 1 and for all j 2 D, d j = 1. When for each i 2 S, s i is a positive integer, we make s i copies of agent i. Similarly, when for each j 2 D, d j is a positive integer, we make d j copies of agent j.
Then we connect all copies of agents i to all copies of j if and only if ij 2 G. Again the statements follow by the GE decomposition of this new bipartite graph. By a common rescaling of s; d, we cover the case where these numbers are rational and positive, and by a straightforward limit argument that of real numbers as well, including possibly zero for some peaks.
For future reference (proof of Proposition 4, step 2) we note that the elements of the partition can be de ned as the solutions of simple maximization problems.
De ne
is supermodular, L is stable by intersection and union, and S is its smallest element, while S [ S 0 is its largest element. De ne similarly M = arg max C D fd C s g(C) g if there is at least one C such that d C > s g(C) , M = ? else. Then M is stable by intersection and union, D is its smallest element, and D [ D 0 its largest element. We omit the straightforward proof.
We give three examples illustrating the decomposition. Example 1. In Figure 1 in Section 1, the partitions are S + = f2; 3; 4g,
Example 2. In Figure 2 in Section 1, the partitions are S + = f1; 2; 3; 4g, D = f1; 2; 3; 4g (there is no S ; D + ; S 0 ; D 0 ). f (i 2 ), we have fi 2 2 S ) i 1 2 S g and fi 1 2 S + ) i 2 2 S + g; for any graph and any pair of demanders j 1 ; j 2 such that g(j 1 ) g(j 2 ), we have
We are now ready to describe the key facts about the set PO(G; R) of Pareto optimal transfers. For a vector of transfers (x; y) 2 R S + R D + , we write its projection on
In the economy (G; R), i) if the net transfer (x; y) implemented by the G-ow ' is Pareto optimal, then transfers occur only between S + and D , S 0 and D 0 , S and D + :
ii) (x; y) 2 PO(G; R) if and only if
(2)
Proof in the Appendix. We will pay special attention to the following subset of PO(G; R), dened by the property that the short side gets its optimal transfer:
(Note that by Lemma 2, the inequalities
cannot be all equalities). We will denote by PO (G; s; d), the set of allocations de ned by (3). In the sequel we focus on allocations in PO (G; s; d),because under the Voluntary trade property, they are the only allocations Pareto optimal for any choice of preferences in R with peaks (s; d).
z; w 2 R N , recall that z Lorenz dominates w, written z LD w, if for all
We say that z is Lorenz dominant in the set A if z LD z 0 for all z 0 2 A. Lorenz dominance is a partial ordering, so not every set, even convex and compact, admits a Lorenz dominant element. On the other hand, in a convex set A there can be at most one Lorenz dominant element.
Now we de ne a family of descending algorithms, one of which dene our solution below. These algorithms apply to the two subproblems (G(S ; D + ); s; d) and (G(S + ; D ); s; d), and we start by the former. For any C D + we simply write g(C) instead of g(C) \ S . Fix a continuous weakly increasing path of net supplies
. The system of inequalities with variable
hods for = 1, even with strict inequalities because of short demand. In view of
such that (4) holds true, equivalently 1 is the largest such that one of the inequalities in (4) is tight. As C ! g(C) ( 1 ) d C is submodular, the equality g(C) ( 1 ) = d C is stable by union and intersection 11 of the sets C. We call C 1 the largest such subset and set T 1 = g(C 1 ). By Lemma 1, the allocation (
we can give ( 1 ) to the agents in C 1 by using all the resources in T 1 and no more.
In the restricted problem (G(S
, so we can repeat the argument above in the restricted problem (G(S T 1 ; D + C 1 ); s; d) to nd the largest number 2 ; 2 < 1 , at which one of the inequalities 11 Take two such subsets C; C 0 and compute
where the former inequality comes from
g 1 (C) ( ) d C becomes an equality. We call C 2 the largest such subset of D + C 1 and set T 2 = g 1 (C 2 ) = g(C 2 ) g(C 1 ). We can achieve the allocation [T 2 ] ( 2 ) for the agents in T 2 by using all the resources in C 2 and no more.
Continuing in this fashion, we de ne a partition C 1 ; C 2 ; , of D + , a partition T 1 ; T 2 ; , of S , and a strictly decreasing sequence 1 > 2 > ; such that the allocation
. The descending algorithm for G(S + ; D ) are de ned similarly by means of a weakly increasing path Example 4. In the absence of bilateral constraints, i.e., if G = S D, we already noticed, immediately after Lemma 2, that the decomposition reduces to one of the three (S ; D + ), (S + ; D ), or (S 0 ; D 0 ). Our solution simply applies the uniform rationing method of Sprumont (1991) to the long side of the market. A similar solution is discussed and characterized in Klaus et al. (1998) . In their model, agents' endowments are known and preferences over \consumption" are reported. In our model, agents report their preferences regarding net trades. We do not assume that the planner has any knowledge regarding endowments or preferences.
Example 5. In the example of Figure 2 , we have S = S + ; D = D , and the descending algorithm stops at 1 = 10; 2 = 8; 3 = 5.
Example 6. School assignment In Figure 5 , there are 8 schools in 4 di erent neighborhoods. In each neighborhood one school is overcrowded and the other is attended below its capacity. Each student can be transferred to a school in the same or an adjacent 
Properties of the egalitarian transfer rule
We discuss the incentives and equity properties of the egalitarian transfer rule, the basis of our characterization result in the next section. Those properties bear on the pro le of individual preferences R, therefore instead of a problem (S; D; G; s; d), we consider now the economy (S; D; G; R) (or simply (G; R)). We use the notation s[
for the peak transfer of supplier i and demander j.
De nition: Given the agents (S; D), a rule selects for every economy
We de ne rst the link monotonicity property, requiring that an agent on either side of the market cannot be hurt by the access to new links. As discussed in the introduction, this ensures that no agent has an incentive to 
And a similar statement where we exchange the role of demanders and suppliers.
We show below that the egalitarian transfer rule is link monotonic. On the other hand, the addition of a link ij may well hurt agents other than i, j. In Figure 6 , we show an example with short demand in which our rule picks the allocation x 1 = 3 and x 2 = 1. After the addition of the link S 2 D 1 , it gives x 1 = x 2 = 2.
Proposition 3: The egalitarian transfer rule is link-monotonic.
Proof in the Appendix.
In the rest of the section we discuss properties for which the graph G is xed, so we write a rule simply as (R) for R 2 R S[D . The next incentive property is the familiar strategyproofness. It is useful to decompose it into a monotonicity and an invariance condition.
Monotonicity: A rule is monotonic if one's net transfer is weakly increasing in her reported peak:
) i (R 0 i ; R i ) = i (R) and a similar statement when j 2 D reports R 0 j 2 R with a peak on the same side of j (R) as the peak of R j .
Each one of monotonicity or invariance implies own-peak-only: my net transfer only depends upon the peak of my preferences, and not on the way I compare transfers across my peak.
The next Lemma connects these three properties and Pareto optimality. Lemma 3: Monotonicity and invariance i) If a rule is monotonic and invariant, it is strategy-proof; ii) An e cient and strategyproof rule is monotonic and invariant. Proof: We omit the easy argument proving statement i), just as in the Sprumont (1991) model. Statement ii) Fix an e cient (Pareto optimal) and strategyproof rule , a preference pro le R 2 R S[D , a supplier i 2 S; and an alternative preference R 0 i 2 R. We use the notation 
, hence a violation of SP for agent i at R 0 . If i (R 0 ) < i (R) we can nd a preference R i with peak s i = s i such that i (R 0 )P i i (R). Then, i (R i ; R i ) = i (R), so agent i with preferences R i bene ts by reporting s 0 i . The proof under the premises of (7) inside the right bracket is identical.
Proposition 4
The egalitarian transfer rule is monotonic and invariant, hence strategyproof as well. Proof in the Appendix.
We now turn to equity properties. The familiar equity test of no envy must be adapted to our model because of the feasibility constraints. If supplier 1 envies the net transfer x 2 of supplier 2, it might not be possible anyway to give him x 2 because the demanders connected to agent 1 do not allow it. Alternatively, if we can exchange the net transfers of 1 and 2, this typically requires to construct a new ow and alter some of the other agents' allocations. In either case we submit that agent 1 has no legitimate claim against the allocation x.
An envy argument by agent 1 against agent 2 is legitimate only if it is feasible to improve upon agent 1's allocation without altering the allocation of anyone other than agent 2.
No envy: Fix G 2 2 S D . A rule satis es no envy if for any preference pro le R 2 R S[D and any i 1 ; i 2 2 S such that i 2 (R)P i 1 i 1 (R), there exists no (x; y) 2 A(G) such that i (R) = x i for all i 2 S n fi 1 ; i 2 g; j (R) = y j for all j 2 D and x i 1 P i 1 i 1 (R) (8) and a similar statement where we exchange the role of demanders and suppliers.
Note that if i 1 ; i 2 have identical connections, i 1 j 2 G , i 2 j 2 G, then no envy implies i 1 (R)P i 1 i 2 (R).
The familiar horizontal equity property must be similarly adapted to account for the bilateral constraints on transfers.
Equal treatment of equals:
and a similar statement where we exchange the role of demanders and suppliers.
Again, if i 1 ; i 2 have identical connections and preferences, ETE implies
Our de nition of ETE is with regard to net trades. As is well-known this is stronger than a version of ETE stated in terms of preferences such as the one in Ching (1994) (9) . Assume without loss 1 (R) < 2 (R). Note that x 1 + x 2 = 1 (R) + 2 (R) so only two cases are possible: 1 (R) < x 1 x 2 < 2 (R), or 1 (R) < x 2 x 1 < 2 (R). Assume the rst case. If s 2 (R), supplier 1 envies 2 via (x; y); similarly s 1 (R) implies a violation of no envy. If x 1 s x 2 , the pro le of transfers (x; y) is Pareto superior to (R) (for both agents). If x 2 < s < 2 (R), the pro le (x 0 ; y); x 0 2 = s ; x 0 1 = x 1 + x 2 s , x 0 k = x k else, is a convex combination of (x; y) and (R), so it is feasible (A(G) is convex), and Pareto superior to (R) (for both agents). The case 1 (R) < s < x 1 leads to a similar violation of PO. In the second case, observe that the pro le (x 0 ; y); x 0 1 = x 0 2 = 1 2 (x 1 +x 2 ); x 0 k = x k else, is a convex combination of (x; y) and (R), so it is feasible and we are back to the rst case. Statement ii). Let be the egalitarian rule, and R be a pro le at which supplier 1 envies supplier 2 via (x; y). We have x 1 + x 2 = E 1 (R) + E 2 (R) and (x; y) coincides with E elsewhere. As E(R) Lorenz dominates x we must have jx 2 x 1 j > jE 2 (R) E 1 (R)j > 0. If x 2 x 1 and E 2 (R) E 1 (R) have the same sign, then we have x 1 < E 1 (R) < E 2 (R) < x 2 (or a symmetric condition by exchanging 1 and 2). Now E 2 (R)
Characterization result
Our last axiom is a basic incentive property stating that each agent is entitled to keep her endowment of the commodity and refuse to trade. Note that link monotonicity implies voluntary trade.
Theorem: The egalitarian transfer rule E is characterized by Pareto optimality, strategyproofness, voluntary trade, and equal treatment of equals. Proof in the Appendix.
Concluding comments
Summary: Our model generalizes to a considerable extent the standard one-sided division model introduced by Sprumont (1991) and its two-sided version considered by Klaus et al. (1998) . This extension generates several hurdles because of additional feasibility constraints imposed by the bipartite graph. The division of the graph in three submarkets in which there is excess supply, balancedness, and excess demand respectively, gives the structure of the Pareto optimal allocations. Then the feasibility constraints are captured by a system of submodular upper bounds on coalitional shares in the excess supply segment of the market, and a system of supermodular lower bounds in the excess demand segment. Finally equal treatment of equals must be restricted to those equalizing transfers that do not a ect the shares of agents not involved in the transfer. After those new features are properly incorporated, our egalitarian transfer solution is characterized by the combination of e ciency, strategyproofness and equal treatment of equals. We conjecture that the egalitarian transfer solution is also robust against coordinated misreport of preferences by any subgroups of agents, i.e. the solution is group strategyproof.
Companion paper : In Bochet et al. (2009) we study the generalization of Sprumont's model to arbitrary bipartite graphs. The suppliers are now passive, they must unload a given amount of the commodity among the set of receivers, who each have a private ideal consumption level. Thus the receivers may have to consume more or less than their peak. This onesided model is simpler, on the other hand we endow each receiver with some capacity constraints (from above and below), which complicates the analysis.
To describe the set of Pareto optimal allocations, we use the same decomposition as in Lemma 2, but its interpretation is di erent. Receivers in D absorb only the resources of S + , and end up consuming less than their peak, while those in D + absorb all resources in S , and end up consuming more than their peak.
We characterize a rule similar to the egalitarian transfer rule by means of e ciency, strategyproofness and equal treatment of equals.
Extensions: First, following Sasaki (1997), Ehlers and Klaus (2003) for the division model under single peaked preferences (Sprumont, 1991), we can think of a \discrete" variant where indivisible units have to be traded between sellers and demanders. Both papers above o er a characterization of the randomized uniform rule, and it is likely that their result can be adapted to our model with bilateral constraints. Second, we have considered here only rules which treat agents as symetrically as possible given the bilateral constraints. But exogenous priority rights may apply to agents on the long side of the market (those who are rationed), in which case we want to understand what incentive compatible rules respect these constraints.
In the one-sided fair division model of Sprumont (1991), the rich family of allotment rules (Barbera, Jackson and Neme, 1997) preserves the incentive properties of the egalitarian rule while allowing a very di erent treatment of the agents. Similarly the family of xed paths rules (Moulin, 1999 ) is characterized by the combination of e ciency, strategyproofness, resource monotonicity and consistency. Further research questions include extending both families to our model.
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Step (i).1 We show
The proof is by contradiction. Pick i j 2 G(S + ; D 0 [ D + ) such that ' i j > 0. We construct rst a transfer path i j ; j i 1 ; i 1 j 1 ; j 1 i 2 ;
; j K 1 i K , entirely in G(S 0 [ S ; D 0 [ D + ) except for the rst edge i j , and such that i) ' i k j k > 0 for every odd edge i k j k ; and ii)
Note that if y j K 1 > d j K 1 then the last edge j K 1 i K is even and i K can be chosen arbitrarily. Note also that some agents may appear multiple times in the path. d j 1 , and we consider T 2 = g(fj ; j 1 g) \ (S 0 [ S ). If there exists i 2 2 T 2 such that x i 2 < s i 2 , then our transfer path will end at i 2 . Else for all i 2 2 T 2 , x i 2 s i 2 . Then we have
(where the second inequality comes from Lemma 2). Some of the net transfer of fj ; j 1 g comes from outside S 0 [ S , hence there exists i 2 2 T 2 and j 2 2 (D 0 [ D + ) fj ; j 1 g such that ' i 2 j 2 > 0. Repeating this construction, after nitely many steps we must reach an i K such that
With our transfer path in hand, we now look for a Pareto improvement of (x; y). This is easy if x i > s i , because we can reduce the net transfer of i by a small amount, and at the same time increase supplier i K 's transfer, or decrease demander j K 1 's transfer, without changing that of any other agent (along or outside the path). We simply take away an "-ow on i j , and add it to the (possibly nil) ow on j i 1 , then take it away from i 1 j 1 , add it to j 1 i 2 , , until we nally either take it away from i K 1 j K 1 (if
Of course " must be smaller than the ow on any odd edge. Thus we have a contradiction.
Assume next x i s i . Then we construct a second transfer path i j 0 1 ; j 0
The argument is similar to the one above: because (G(S + ; D ); s; d) has short-supply, the set C 1 = f (i )\D is non empty; if it contains j 0 1 such that y j 0
, the path stops at j 0 1 i 0 1 where i 0 1 is arbitrary; else we have y C 1 d C 1 , that we combine with s i < d C 1 ((G(S + ; D ); s; d) has short supply) and x i s i to deduce x i < y C 1 , hence some of the net transfer of C 1 comes from other suppliers than i and we can nd j 0 1 2 C 1 ; i 0 1 2 S + fi g such that ' i 0
, the path ends right there, otherwise we consider
, and so on.
Check that the concatenation of the two transfer paths leads to a Pareto improvement, thus concluding the proof of Step (i).1. If in the rst transfer path x i K < s i K and in the second
, and so on, until we take " away from ' i j , add it to ' i 1 j , and continue as two paragraphs above until we
, we take " away from the ow on all odd edges in the path i 0
The proof mimics that of Step (i).1, hence is omitted. Statement (ii) We x (x; y) 2 PO(G; R) and a G-ow ' implementing (x; y). d [D ] , using once again a "transfer path" argument.
Suppose i 1 2 S + is such that x i 1 < s i 1 . We construct, exactly like in step (i).1 (second construction), a path i j 0 1 ; j 0
The same transfer argument contradicts the Pareto optimality of (x; y). This proves
Next we suppose j 1 2 D is such that y j 1 > d j 1 . We construct a transfer path j 1 i 1 ; i 1 j 2 ;
; j K i K , entirely in G(S + ; D ) and such that i) ' i k j k > 0 for every odd edge j k i k ; and ii) x i K > s i K or y j K 1 < d j K 1 . This will allow a Pareto improving transfer in the usual way. To build the rst edge of the path, consider the non empty set T 1 = fi 2 S + j' ij 1 > 0g. If it contains i 1 such that x i 1 > s i 1 we can stop. Otherwise we have
; moreover x T 1 = y j 1 by de nition of T 1 , so using the fact that (G(S + ; D ); s; d) has short supply
hence f (T 1 ) fj 1 ; j 2 g is non empty. And so on.The proof of the "only if" statement is complete.
Suppose now that an allocation (x; y) de ned in (2) is Pareto dominated by some (x 0 ; y 0 ) 2 A(G). As each supplier in S + gets at least her peak transfer at x, the same is true at x 0 :
. Similarly, as each demander in D gets at most her peak transfer at y, then at y 0 , by singlepeakedness of preferences,
. Because D can only receive commodity from S + we have y 0
Proposition 2
The descending algorithms along the paths (5),(6), de ne the Lorenz dominant element in PO (G; s; d). Proposition 1 says that the set PO (G; s; d) (system (3)) is the cartesian product of three sets:
To prove that (x; y); de ned by the two algorithms (5),(6) is Lorenz dominant in PO (G; s; d), it is therefore enough to show separately that (
We prove the former and omit the similar argument for the latter.
We simplify notation by writing the suppliers' net transfers in S as x, instead of x [S ] . Recall that the de nition of x involves two parallel partitions of D + and S :
; moreover in x, the demanders in C k receive transfers only from the suppliers in T k , and those transfers are the optimal ones. Finally the net transfer of supplier i 2 T k is x i = minf k ; s i g.
We further partition T k as follows
The set A 1 is non empty because
where the strict inequality is explained in the de nition of the ascending algorithm.
Repeating this argument shows A k 6 = ? for all k. Next we label the agents in S as f1;
; jS jg in such a way that the sequence x i is weakly decreasing and moreover the rst jA 1 j terms cover A 1 the next terms cover a possibly empty subset e B 1 of B 1 the next jA 2 j terms cover A 2 the next terms cover a possibly empty subset e
and so on. This is possible because in A k everyone gets k and the sequence k decreases strictly. Before A k we need not pick any coordinate in B k 0 ; k 0 k, because such an agent receives no more than k .
We x now an arbitrary (x; d [D + ] ) 2 PO (G(S ; D + ); s; d) and check that x is Lorenz dominated by x. We use the notation x (i) = P jS j i+1 j=jS j x j (recall x is the order statistics of x), so that x T x (jT j) for all T . If T S is such that x T = x (jT j) we say that T is an x-tail. From our labeling of S , any subset fx 1 ; ; x i g is an x-tail. We want to prove x (t) x (t) for all t = 1;
; jS j. By feasibility x T 1 d C 1 = x T 1 and by Pareto optimality and Proposition 1, x x in B 1 . Therefore x T x T for all T T 1 such that T 1 T B 1 . In particular
If the above T is an x-tail (i.e., if T A 1 contains the largest elements of e B 1 ), (11) gives x (jT j) x T x (jT j). Next we note that where the equality is because x is egalitarian in A 1 . We have proved the desired inequality x (t) x (t) up to t = jA 1 [ e B 1 j. Next consider T 2 . Feasibility implies
and Pareto optimality gives x x in B 1 [ B 2 . Therefore
Again if we choose for T an x-tail, the inequality x (t)
, with jT j = t. Because x is egalitarian in A 2 , we have
We claim
which will imply x (t) x (t) because x T x T is true both for A 1 [ e B 1 and A 1 [ e B 1 [ A 2 . The claim follows from the following fact: if X; Y; Z are three disjoint subsets, we have
jY j+jZj x Y [Z is no more than the sum of the jY j largest terms in x [Y [Z] , and x X is no more than the sum of the jXj largest terms in x [X] . Applying this inequality to
A straightforward induction argument concludes the proof.
Proposition 3
The egalitarian transfer rule is link-monotonic.
Fix the economy (G; R), and i 2 S, j 2 D such that i j = 2 G.
Write S + ; D + ; ::; and S 0 + ; D 0 + ; ::; for the Gallai-Edmonds decompositions of G and G 0 . If i 2 S + [S 0 and j 2 D + [D 0 , then these two decompositions coincide and E(R; G) = E(R; G 0 ). From now on we assume i 2 S .
Case 1: j 2 D + The GE decompositions in G and G 0 are identical, so we can restrict attention to (S ; D + ; G(S ; D + )), because the links of D + with S + [ S 0 play no role. The egalitarian allocation denoted (x; y) at G(S ; D + ) gives (see section 4) the partitions C 1 ; C 2 ; , of D + , and T 1 ; T 2 ; , of S , as well as the strictly decreasing sequence 1 > 2 > :
where i ( ) = minf ; s i g. The key fact is that we assign for all k the resources in C k to the agents in
and only to those.
Assume i 2 T k ; j 2 C k 0 . If k k 0 , we see that the partitions C l ; T l and the sequence l are unchanged by the addition of link i j : for instance g 0 (C 1 ) = g(C 1 ) and g 0 (C) g(C) for all C, so C 1 ; T 1 , and 1 are unchanged; then g 0 (C 2 ) T 1 = g(C 1 ) T 1 and g 0 (C) T 1 g(C) T 1 for all C, so C 2 ; T 2 , and 2 are unchanged; and so on. Thus the egalitarian allocation does not change.
Assume next k > k 0 , so that the partitions and parameters may change at G 0 (S ; D + ). Let x 0 be the new egalitarian allocation for S , we assume x 0 i < x i = minf k ; s i g; and derive a contradiction of the Lorenz optimality of x 0 . Set A = C 1 [ [C k , B = T 1 [ [T k and note two facts: g 0 (A) = B, and the egalitarian allocation x at G is such that minf k ; s i g x i for all i 2 B.
Let ' 0 be the G 0 -ow implementing the allocation (x 0 ; d). As in the proof of Proposition 1, we construct a transfer path i j 1 ; j 1 i 1 ; i 1 j 2 ; j 2 i 2 ;
; j T i T , entirely in G 0 (B; A) such that i) ' 0 itjt > 0 for every even edge i t j t ; and ii)
If there exists i 1 2 B 1 such that x 0 i 1 > minf k ; s i 1 g, then the path stops at j 1 i 1 . Otherwise, let A 2 = f 0 (B 1 [ fi g) \ A and consider the set B 2 = fi 2 2 B n B 1 [ fi g : ' 0 i 2 j 2 > 0 for some j 2 2 A 2 g. It is non empty, otherwise we have
If there exists i 2 2 B 2 such that x 0 i 2 > minf k ; s i 2 g, then then the path stops at j 2 i 2 . Otherwise, we continue iteratively until we nd an i T such that x 0 i T > minf k ; s i T g. By Pareto optimality, we have x 0 i T s i T , therefore x 0 i T > k , while by assumption x 0 i < minf k ; s i g. Now our transfer path provides a feasible Pigou-Dalton transfer at x 0 between i and i T : we take away from ' 0 an "-ow from j T i T , add it to i T 1 j T , take it from j T 1 i T 1 , etc.., until we add it to i j 1 . This contradicts the Lorenz optimality of x 0 .
Now adding the link i j can change the GE decomposition. If in the new decomposition, i 2 S 0 + [ S 0 0 then i cannot be worse o because he gets his peak transfer. Now we assume i 2 S 0 , implying j 2 D 0 + . We restrict attention to G 0 (S 0 ; D 0 + ). Write (x 0 ; d) the egalitarian transfer solution at G 0 . The corresponding partitions are T 0k ; C 0k and the parameters 0k . Assume, without loss of generality, that in the descending algorithm at G 0 , i 2 T 0 2 and
We let (x; y) be the egalitarian allocation at G and let ' be a G-ow which implements it. We assume x i > minf 02 ; s i g, and derive a contradiction of the Lorenz optimality of (x; y). We construct again, a transfer path i j 1 ; j 1 i 1 ; i 1 j 2 ; j 2 i 2 ;
; j T i T , entirely in G(S 0 n T 01 ; D 0 + ) such that i) ' i j 1 ; ' i t 1 jt > 0 for every odd edge i t 1 j t ; and ii) x i T < minf 02 ; s i T g. Note that some agents may appear multiple times in the path.
Let
We have i 2 B 1 and claim B 1 n i 6 = ;: otherwise in G 0 , A 1 D 0 + n C 01 is only connected to i and to some suppliers outside S 0 n T 01 ; the transfers to A 1 in any ow achieving x 0 are entirely borne by G 0 (S 0 n T 01 ; D 0 + ), therefore x 0
i < x i . If there exists i 1 2 B 1 n i such that x i 1 < minf 02 ; s i 1 g, then the path stops at j 1 i 1 . Otherwise, let A 2 = fj 2 2 D : ' i 1 j 2 > 0 for some i 1 2 B 1 g. We have as above A 2 D 0 + n C 1 and d A 2 = x B 1 . Consider the set B 2 = g 0 (A 2 ) \ fS 0 n T 01 g. We have B 1 B 2 and we claim B 2 n B 1 6 = ;. Otherwise in G 0 , A 2 D 0 + C 01 is only connected to B 1 and to some suppliers outside S 0 n T 01 ; the transfers to A 2 in any ow achieving x 0 are entirely borne by
. But we have assumed x i minf 02 ; s i g for all i 2 B 1 n i , and B 1 S 0 n T 01 implies minf 02 ; s i g x 0 i . Therefore x 0
If there exists i 2 2 B 2 such that x i 2 < minf 02 ; s i 2 g, then the path stops at j 2 i 2 . Otherwise, we continue in this fashion until we complete the construction of the announced path. We proceed then to take away an "-ow from i j 1 , add it to j 1 i 1 , etc.., until nally adding it to j T i T . This achieves a Pigou-Dalton transfer from i to i T , in contradiction of the Lorenz optimality of x:
Proposition 4
The egalitarian transfer rule is monotonic and invariant, hence strategyproof as well.
Proof Because the egalitarian transfer rule is peak-only, it is enough to speak of the pro les of peaks, instead of the full edged preferences. We x a supplier i 2 S and a benchmark pro le (s; d), with corresponding egalitarian transfers (x; y).
We consider a change of peak by agent i to s 0 i , and we write s 0 i 0 = s i 0 for all i 0 6 = i, so that s 0 = (s 0 i ; s i ) with corresponding allocation (x 0 ; y 0 ). As usual we omit the entirely similar argument for a change of peak by a demander j.
Step 1 
for some subset T of S + (s; d) containing i. Let T be the largest T contained in S + (s; d) and satisfying (14) (well de ned by the usual submodularity argument). Recall from the proof of Lemma 2 that e
is still a solution of arg max T S fs T d f (T ) g, therefore it is the smallest. So i 2 S 0 (s ; d) and we have
We shall prove in step 3 below that for any s 0 i > s i we have x 0 i s i , thus completing the proof of monotonicity when i 2 S + (s; d).
Step 2. Step 4 We check nally the invariance property. In the premises of (7) the case x i > s i (s[R i ] < i (R)), never happens for the egalitarian transfer solution; the case s i > x i only happens if i 2 S (s; d). If s 0 i is another peak such that s i > s 0 i > x i , we saw in Case 1 of Step 2 that x 0 i = x i , as required by Invariance. This is still true for s 0 i = x i by an easy continuity argument (omitted fro brevity). If s 0 i > s i > x i , then the GE decomposition is unchanged at (s 0 ; d). By the recursive de nition of the egalitarian solution in S (s; d), agent i receives k , one of the parameters generating the partitions C 1 ; C 2 ; , and T 1 ; T 2 ; , of D + and S , and it is clear that the same partitions and parameters 1 ; 2 , de ne the same egalitarian solution in S (s 0 ; d).
Characterization Theorem
The egalitarian transfer rule E is characterized by Pareto optimality, strategyproofness, voluntary trade, and equal treatment of equals.
The egalitarian transfer rule selects by construction E(R) 2 PO (G; s; d) for all R, and E i (R) Step 2 It remains to prove that for all R the projections of (R) on S (s; 
x i s i for all i 2 S (s; d)
For the submodular cooperative game (S (s; d); v) with v(T ) = d f (T ) the system (17) means that x is in the core; and (18) captures voluntariness of trade.
Step 2.1 In this step we consider a pro le R in which all suppliers have the same peak, s[R i ] = s[R i 0 ] for all i; i 0 2 S (there are no constraints on the preferences of demanders). For simplicity we write S instead of S (s; d).
We use ETE to show that x = [S ] (R) is precisely x = E [S ] (R), the Lorenz dominant transfer pro le within the set de ned by the system (17), (18) .
Claim 1. Pick an agent 1 in S such that x 1 = x , where = jS j (so x 1 = max S x i ). Then:
As x is Lorenz dominant we have x x . If x i = x for all i 2 S , then x = x (because x S = x S ) and we are done. Suppose next there is at least one i 2 S such that x i < x . We show that if x i < s i , there exists a coalition S(i) S containing i but not 1, such that x S(i) = v(S(i)). Suppose, on the contrary, x T < v(T ) for all T S containing i but not 1. A Pigou Dalton transfer from x 1 to x i transforms x into x 0 such that x 0 1 = x 1 "; x 0 i = x i + ", x j = x 0 j elsewhere. If " is small enough, we have x 0 T < v(T ) for all T S and x 0 i < s i , therefore x 0 satis es (17) , (18) . This is a contradiction of ETE.
We set S = [ i:x i <x ;s i S(i). By submodularity of v we have x S = v(S ). By construction for all i 2 N S , x i is x or s i , hence x i x i ; moreover N S contains 1. On the other hand we have
Combining this with x i x i on N S gives (19).
Claim 2 Pick agent 2 in S , 2 6 = 1, such that x 2 = x ( 1) . Then
As x Lorenz dominates x, we have x +x ( 1) x +x ( 1) ) x ( 1) x ( 1) . If x i = x ( 1) for all i 2 S f1g, then x = x and we are done. Suppose now there is at least one i 2 S f1g such that x i < x ( 1) . By the same argument as above, if x i < s i there exists a coalition S(i) S containing i but not 2, such that x S(i) = v(S(i)) (else we can construct a Pigou-Dalton transfer from 2 to i, contradicting ETE). Set S = [ i:x i <x ( 1) ;s i S(i), then x S = v + (S ) by submodularity of v. Moreover for all i in N (S [ f1g), x i is x ( 1) or s i , in particular x i x i . Combining this with x 1 = x 1 , and x N S x N S (proven by (20)), we see that x and x coincide in N S , that contains 2. Property (21) follows.
The inductive argument establishing x = x is now clear.
Step 2.2 We just proved that and E coincide on S when all suppliers have the same peak. We use another induction argument, inspired by Ching (1993) , to establish this equality for an arbitrary pro le R. We use the following notation: for R; e R 2 R S[D and T S, (R [T ] ; e R [(S T ) [D] ) is the pro le equal to R for agents in T and to e R elsewhere. Fix a pro le e R where all suppliers have identical preferences, an integer n; 0 n jSj 1 and consider the following subset of preference pro les i (R) (Monotonicity), and E i (R 0 ) = E i (R) (Invariance).
It remains to check i (R) = E i (R) for i 2 S T . This is clear in S S (R), so we check it for S (R) T . Write S = S (R) and x = Then the proof proceeds exactly as in step 2.1. We omit the details. We have proved that H + (jSj 1) for any choice of e R. Now consider an arbitrary pro le R and choose i in S and such that s[R i ] s[R i 0 ] for all i 0 2 S. Choosing for e R the pro le of preferences e R i 0 = R i for all i 0 2 S; e R j = R j for all j 2 D, we have R 2 B( e R; jSj 1) and the proof is complete.
